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STRAINING THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY:
AQUINAS ON THE IMMORTALITY
OF THE HUMAN SOUL
Linda L. Farmer

It is customary in the literature on Aquinas to hear mention, critiques, and

defenses of Aquinas's "proofs of the human soul's immortality." Such do
not, at least technically, exist. Aquinas's conclusions of the proofs in question always and only conclude that the human soul is incorruptible. The
question this paper is concerned with is whether the distinction between
'incorruptibility' and 'immortality' prohibits us from considering Aquinas's
arguments for the soul's incorruptibility to be, as we are already so habituated to claim, arguments for the immortality of the human soul. To answer
that question, we attempt to extend Aquinas's two main philosophical
demonstrations of the human soul's incorruptibility to immortality without
violating any of Aquinas's philosophical principles. What we find is that
this cannot be done and that, for Aquinas, the immortality of the human
soul can only be theologically demonstrated.

Aquinas never demonstrates the immortality of the human soul. In fact, he
never even offers philosophical arguments in support of such a thesis. Each
of Aquinas's so-called arguments for the soul's immortality concludes that
the soul is incorruptible, not that it is immortal. This fact is commonly unacknowledged in the literature,! perhaps because the terms 'incorruptibility'
and 'immortality' are considered to be synonymous or, at least, interchangeable. These two notions are, however, formally distinct: 'incorruptibility' refers to being/existence, 'immortality' to life/vital activity. What is
the significance of this distinction? Does it prohibit us from considering
Aquinas's arguments for the soul's incorruptibility to be, as we are already
so habituated to claim, arguments for the immortality of the human soul?
To address these questions, we shall first examine Aquinas's use of the
concepts 'immortality' and 'incorruptibility', particularly in his arguments
concerned with whether physical death destroys the soul. As those arguments conclude that the soul is incorruptible, we shall then examine
whether Aquinas's two main types of arguments for the soul's incorruptibility can be extended in such a way as to demonstrate the soul's immortality. The conclusion we shall reach is that Aquinas's philosophical commitments place him in a very awkward situation with respect to the
immortality of the human soul, namely, that he can philosophically maintain that the human soul will continue to exist after physical death but not
that it will be actually alive in the separated state.
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1. Terminological and Conceptual Considerations
It is not surprising that we are, generally speaking, in the habit of saying

that Aquinas argues for the immortality of the human soul. For the question Aquinas poses before an argument concerned with whether physical
death destroys the soul may explicitly concern immortality rather than
incorruptibility;2 and, perhaps more importantly, Aquinas frequently uses
the notions 'immortality' and 'incorruptibility' interchangeably.3
Given these facts one would reasonably expect to find the terminology
of immortality in at least one of Aquinas's arguments concerning whether
the soul is destroyed at physical death. This is, however, glaringly not the
case. Aquinas consistently and exclusively uses the terminology of incorruptibility in the conclusion of those arguments:
We must assert that the intellectual principle which we call the
human soul is incorruptible. 4
Now, from what has just been said it is clearly shown that every
intellectual substance is incorruptible. s
It must be stated that it is necessary that a human soul be totally

incorruptible.6
It is tempting to assume that Aquinas does not consciously avoid using
the terminology of immortality and, thereby, does not consciously avoid
arguing the claim that the soul is immortal. However, one of Aquinas's
own statements undermines the legitimacy of such an assumption: "if the
resurrection of the body be denied it is not easy, in fact it is difficult, to
maintain the immortality of the soul".7
If, then, 'incorruptibility' and 'immortality' are interchangeable notions,
as the literature on Aquinas apparently assumes,B why does Aquinas say
that it is difficult to, not just demonstrate, but maintain the soul's immortality
without the support of the truth of faith that the body will be resurrected?
Does not Aquinas unflinching stand behind his philosophical demonstrations of the incorruptibility of the soul? Clearly, the problem rests in the
assumption that 'incorruptibility' and 'immortality' are fundamentally
interchangeable notions.
The formal distinction between those notions, as we mentioned earlier,
is that 'incorruptibility' refers to being/ existence, whereas 'immortality'
refers to life/vital activity. To claim, then, that the human soul is incorruptible is to claim that its being/existence (esse) cannot be destroyed with the
corruption of the composite (viz., the human being); and to claim that the
human soul is immortal is to claim that the soul's life is not destroyed with
the corruption of the composite. Aquinas argues for the first, but believes
that the latter, as we just saw, requires the support of a truth of faith. To
understand why, we need to determine what significant differences exist
between the two claims. We can achieve this by attempting to substitute
the 'difficult to maintain' claim that the soul is immortal in Aquinas's arguments for the incorruptibility of the human soul and seeing what sorts of
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difficulties, if any, that would give rise to in Aquinas's philosophical
anthropology.

II. Aquinas's Arguments for Incorruptibility
Aquinas argues for the incorruptibility of the human soul in two main
ways: from the principle 'nothing can be separated from itself'; and from
the immateriality of the human intellect." Let us consider each of these in
turn to see whether they can be extended to the claim that the human
soul's life is not destroyed with the corruption of the composite.
(i)

The argument for incorruptibility from the principle 'nothing
can be separated from itself'

The argument from the principle 'nothing can be separated from itself' sets
forth that the soul's act of being (esse) cannot be corrupted by physical
death because it is consequent upon the soul in virtue of itself; and what
belongs to something in virtue of itself is inseparable from it:
Now it was shown above that the souls of brutes are not self-subsistent, whereas the human soul is, so that the souls of brutes are corrupted, when their bodies are corrupted, while the human soul could
not be corrupted unless it were corrupted in itself. [... ] For it is clear
that what belongs to a thing by virtue of the thing itself is inseparable
from it. But being belongs to a form, which is an act, by virtue of
itself. And thus, matter acquires actual being according as it acquires
form; while it is corrupted so far as the form is separated from it. But
it is impossible for a subsistent form to cease to exist.lD
The naturally incorruptibility of the human soul is assured, according to
Aquinas, because the act of being (esse) by which a human being exists does
not properly belong to the composite of soul and matter but, rather, to the
soul which animates that matter. This distinguishes human beings from all
other animate beings, whose esse properly belongs to the composite of their
soul and matter, not to their souls alone. It also ensures, through the principle 'nothing can be separated from itself', the continued existence of the
human soul after its separation from the matter with which it was united.
Can this argument for the incorruptibility of the human soul be extended, in a manner consistent with Aquinas's philosophical principles, to the
immortality of the human soul? The argument would take something like
the following form: the soul's life cannot be corrupted by physical death
because it is consequent upon the soul in virtue of itself; and what belongs
to something in virtue of itself is inseparable from it. So, does or can
Aquinas maintain that life is consequent upon the soul in virtue of itself?
While it is clear that, according to Aquinas, the soul is in virtue of itself
the cause of life, this is insufficient to ensure the immortality of the soul
from the principle 'nothing can be separated from itself'. As it stands, the
argument allows us to conclude only that the soul cannot cease to be the
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cause of life, not that soul cannot cease to be actually living. To be the cause of
some perfection is not necessarily equivalent to possessing that perfection
in act. For example, the human soul is the formal, efficient, and final cause
of the human body but is not itself a body.l1 Moreover, the human soul is
the cause of all of the sensitive perfections of human beings but does not,
according to Aquinas, possess any sensitive perfection in act in the separated stateY Furthermore, the souls of plants and non-human animals are also
the cause of their life, but the immortality of those types of souls is denied
by Aquinas. 13
For the desired conclusion that the human soul possesses life in act in
the separated state, it would need to be the case that the soul possesses life
in virtue of itself, not merely that it is the cause of life in virtue of itself. For
it is not because the human soul is the cause of being that it is incorruptible
--otherwise, the souls and animals and plants as well as every sort of substantial form would be incorruptible- but, rather, because the human soul
is itself the subject of the act of being (esse). As the substantial form of the
body, the soul, of course, makes the body to be in act but it is only because
it is itself the subject of esse that, in separation from the body, it is actually
in being.
Does, then, the human soul possess life in the way that it possesses esse,
viz. in virtue of itself? Is the human soul, rather than the human composite
of soul and matter, the proper subject of the perfection of life? Unless
Aquinas was mistaken in asserting that the immortality of the soul is difficult to maintain without the resurrection of the body, it must be the case
that the human soul is not the proper subject of the perfection of life.
Otherwise, immortality is demonstrated by Aquinas inasmuch and insofar
as incorruptibility is. Consequently, there would be no reason for him to be
any less confident in the philosophical demonstrability of immortality than
he was of the demonstrability of the soul's incorruptibility.
Yet, there are passages in Aquinas's works in which he seems to maintain that life and esse are possessed by the human soul in the same manner.
For example, in the fourteenth question of his Quaestiones de anima, the following objection is raised:
[... J Augustine says that just as God is the life of a soul, so a soul is the
life of its body.[uJ But death is the privation of life; hence by death a
soul is deprived of life and destroyed. IS
To which Aquinas replies:
A soul is said to be the form of its body insofar as it is the cause of
life, just as the form is the principle of existing. For in beings which
are alive, their 'to live' is their 'to be', as the Philosopher says in Book
II of the De anima. '6
This text, however, seems to allow for two different interpretations.
Aquinas may, on the one hand, be saying that life is possessed by the soul
in the same way as the act of being is possessed. Or on the other hand, he
may only be saying here that the cause of the body's being and life is one
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and the same (i.e. the soul) and, consequently, that just as the soul as cause
of being is not corrupted by physical death, so neither is the soul as cause of
life [or, for that matter, as cause of all other perfections (corporeity, sensitivity, etc.)] corrupted by physical death.
Although the text is ambiguous on this point, the second interpretation
seems more contextually appropriate. For, in saying that "the soul is the
form of the body insofar as it is the cause of life, just as the form is the principle of existence," the similarity drawn between life and being is in terms
of the soul as cause (cause of life I cause of existence).
Furthermore, had Aquinas wanted to say that the soul possesses life and
being in the same way rather than just say that the soul is the cause of both
the body's being and life, he could simply have restricted the statement "in
beings which are alive, their to live is their to be" to subsistent forms, saying instead "in subsistent beings, their to live is their to be." For, the cause
of the being and life of animals and plants is their soul, but the souls of animals and plants are not subsistent: their act of being (esse) is properly possessed by the composite and, consequently, corruptible. Moreover, to be
even less ambiguous, Aquinas could have simply said that "the life of the
human soul is its being."
That Aquinas only believed that the soul is the cause of life but not of
itself actually alive in the same way that it is of itself actually in being can
be supported by the fact that, in at least one work, his De immortalitate animae,'7 Aquinas himself rejects the demonstration of the soul's immortality
from the fact that the soul is the cause of life and "nothing can be separated from itself."'S He does so because "the reasons for immortality [must]
be taken from what is proper to the human soul amongst other souls,
namely, intellection" .'9
Although he does not reject that argument because it is not the case that
the being and life of the human soul are possessed in act in the same way
(and not just that they are caused by the same principle), the fact that he
requires that "the reasons for immortality be taken from what is proper to
the human soul amongst other souls" is strongly indicative. For, it is not
proper to the human soul to be the cause of life -the souls of all animate
beings are equally the cause of life- and, consequently, the argument that
the human soul is immortal because it is the cause of life (and 'nothing can
be separated from itself') must be rejected, as, it equally applies to the souls
of animals and plants but, the souls of animals and plants are absolutely
not, at least in Aquinas's opinion, immortal. 20
If, however, Aquinas believes that being and life are not merely caused
by the same principle but possessed in act in the same way, he would not
need to reject the argument as such because, with this premise "being and
life are possessed in act in the same way," the argument would only conclude to the immortality of the human soul, not to that of every sort of soul.
For, if "being and life are possessed in act in the same way" and, in plants
and animals, being is possessed in act by the composite, the life of plants
and animals would be corrupted with the corruption of the composite just
as their being is corrupted. However, if "being and life are possessed in act
in the same way" and being is properly possessed in act by the human soul
rather than the composite (as Aquinas maintains), then the soul could not
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cease to be alive in act with the corruption of the composite, just as it cannot cease to be actually in being when the composite is corrupted.
There are, as we have just seen, good reasons to think that Aquinas does
not set forth that life is possessed by the human soul in virtue of itself. Our
reasons for thinking that will become even more compelling when we consider his argument for incorruptibility from the immateriality of the intellect, which we will do next. However, that Aquinas's argument for incorruptibility based on the principle "nothing can be separated from itself"
cannot be extended to immortality based on the fact that the soul is the
cause of life needs no further evidence: it is insufficient just in itself to conclude that the human soul (and only the human soul) is immortal and, further, Aquinas himself rejects this type of argument for immortality.
(ii)

The argument for incorruptibility from the immateriality of the
human intellect

The second main type of argument Aquinas offers for the incorruptibility
of the human soul is from the immateriality of the human intellect.
According to this argument, the human soul must be incorruptible because
it has an essential operation, viz. intellection, in which the body does not
share. Intelligence of universals by the human intellect requires, according
to Aquinas, that the human intellect be neither itself a body nor utilize a
corporeal organ in its operation. This operative independence of the
human soul, however, can only be explained by a corresponding independence in the order of being. For this reason, the soul must be a subsistent
substantial form (i.e., itself the subject of the act of being) and, consequently, cannot lose its being through the corruption of the composite. 21
If the operative independence of the soul in intellection can serve to
demonstrate the incorruptibility of the human soul, could it not also serve
to demonstrate the immortality of the human soul? If our intellective
power is not, as Aquinas argues, the act of any corporeal organ and our
soul is subsistent (itself the subject of the act of being), would it not be the
case that our soul could and would exercise a vital activity in separation
from the body (namely, intellection) and, therefore, be alive in act?
Unfortunately, there is a serious difficulty involved in attempting to
extend Aquinas's philosophical demonstration of incorruptibility from the
immateriality of the intellect to the immortality of the human soul.
Although it is true that our intellective power is not the act of any corporeal organ, phantasms are required for any human thinking. If the intellective power of the soul, while being immaterial, yet objectively depends on
phantasms in order to think/know, would it not then be impossible for the
human soul to exercise its power of intellection in separation from the corporeal organs in which phantasms reside?
To solve this difficulty Aquinas argues that the soul will have a different
mode of understanding when separated from its body. He posits that a
separated soul has a different mode of being than a soul united to its body
and, consequently, as the mode of action in every agent follows from the
mode of its being, the mode of understanding of a separated soul will differ from that of a soul in a state of union with the body. Rather than tum to
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phantasms (which is the mode of understanding proper to the human
soul), the separated soul will, according to Aquinas, tum to pure intelligibles (which is the mode of understanding proper to separate substances):
[... ] we must consider that nothing acts except so far as it is actual,
and therefore the mode of action in every agent follows from the
mode of its being. Now the soul has one mode of being when in the
body, and another when apart from it, though its nature remains the
same. [... ] The soul, therefore, when united to the body, consistently
with that mode of being, has a mode of understanding by turning to
corporeal phantasms, which are in corporeal organs; but when it is
separated from the body, it has a mode of understanding by turning
to the pure intelligibles, as is proper to other separate substances.22
Nevertheless, as it is natural for the soul to understand by abstracting
from phantasms23 and death does not change the nature of the soul, the
separated soul's mode of understanding (namely, turning pure intelligibles rather than to phantasms) is, according to Aquinas, unnatural
(praeter naturam):
[... ] it is as natural for the soul to understand by turning to the phantasms, as it is for it to be joined to the body. But to be separated from
the body is not in accordance with its nature, and likewise to understand without turning to the phantasms is not natural to it. 24
Accordingly, then, the soul is unable to think/know in any natural way
apart from its body and, consequently, the argument from the immateriality of the soul's power of intellection fails to philosophically demonstrate the
immortality of the soups In order to live while disembodied, the soul must
be capable of exercising at least one of its acts / powers in separation from
the body and, although preternaturally the soul will be supplied an alternative to phantasms for its intellectual activity, it cannot be philosophically
demonstrated that this will be the case. 26
We are now in a position to understand why Aquinas sets forth that "if
the resurrection of the body be denied it is not easy, in fact it is difficult, to
maintain the immortality of the soul" and, also, why he could not have
maintained that the human soul is the proper subject of the perfection of
life. While he could argue on philosophical grounds that the human soul
does not lose its being at physical death, and perhaps even that in such a
state the soul would have a different mode of being, he could not guarantee on philosophical grounds that the separated soul would exercise a vital
activity like intellection. That guarantee is provided by the final purpose of
the separated state, viz. the resurrection of the body.

III. Conclusion
Aquinas's philosophical principles place him in a very awkward situation
with respect to the immortality of the human soul: he can philosophically
maintain that the soul will be continue to exist in a different mode after
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physical death but not that it will be supplied an alternative to the phantasms it requires in order to exercise its vital activity of intellection. The
tenet that the soul will be supplied with an alternative to phantasms and,
consequently, that it will actually exercise a vital activity in the separated
state is theological, not philosophical. Aquinas's position on the immortality of the soul truly strains the limits of philosophy: as much as immortality
is strongly suggested, even implied, by Aquinas's philosophical principles,
it is only assured by a truth of faith. As Aquinas respects the boundary
between faith and reason in his arguments concerned with whether the
human soul is corrupted at physical death, we should follow suit and cease
claiming that he offers philosophical demonstrations of the immortality of
the human soul.

Wright State University
NOTES
1. Restricting ourselves to just a few examples, see: Donald Abel's
"Intellectual Substance as Form of the Body in Aquinas," in Proceedings of the
American Catholic Philosophical Association: The Recovery of Form, ed. By ThereseAnne Druart, Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1996; Joseph
Bobik's "Immortality," Philosophical Studies (Ireland) 25 (1977): 69-85; Montague
Brown's "Aquinas on the Resurrection of the Body," Thomist 56 (1992): 165-207;
Anton C. Pegis's "The Separated Soul and Its Nature in St. Thomas," in St.
Thomas Aquinas 1274-1974, Commemorative Studies, ed. By Armand Maurer,
Toronto: PIMS, 1974; Stephen Priest's "Aquinas's Claim 'Anima Mea Non Est
Ego," Heythrop Journal 40 (1999): 209-211; Mary F. Rousseau's "Elements of a
Thomistic Philosophy of Death," Thomist 43 (1979): 581-602; Kenneth L.
Schmitz's "Purity of Soul and Immortality," Monist 69 (1986): 396-415; and
John L. Treloar's "Pomponazzi's Critique of Aquinas' Arguments for the
Immortality of the Soul," Thomist 54 (1990): 453-470. Joseph Owens discusses
the distinction between 'incorruptibility' and 'immortality' but remains convinced that the distinction does not prohibit Aquinas from philosophically
demonstrating the immortality of the human soul: see his "Aquinas on the
Inseparability of Soul from Existence," New Scholasticism 61 (1987): 249-270.
2. Quaestiones de anima, q. 14 (Leonine edition, p. 123): "Quartodecimo
queritur de immortalitate anime humane." However, this is not always the
case. See, for instance, Summa theologiae, I, q.75, art.6 (Ottawa edition, p.444b):
"Utrum anima humana sit corruptibilis."
3. See the instances of immortalis and immortalitas in Busa's Index
Thomisticus, sec. II, Concord. I, vol. 11, pp. 57-62.
4. Summa theologiae, I, q. 75, art. 6 (Ottawa edition, p. 445a, 1.30-33):
"Dicendum quod necesse est dicere animam humanam, quam dicimus intellectivum principium, esse incorruptibilem."
5. Summa contra gentiles, II, cap.55, §.1.
6. Quaestiones de anima, q.14, resp. (Leonine edition, p.125, 1.163-164):
"Dicendum quod necesse est omnino animam humanam incorruptibilem esse,"
7. In I Cor., IS, lect. 2 (Vives edition, p. 33b): "Si negetur resurrectio corporis, non de facili, imo (sic) difficile est sustinere immortalitatem animae".
(Emphasis mine.)
8. See references in note 1.
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9. Aquinas does offer other types of arguments for the incorruptibility of
the soul: e.g. from the way in whlch forms progressively dominate the limitations of matter (see, for instance, Summa theologiae, I, q. 76, art. I, in corp. and
Quaestiones de anima, q. I, in corp.); and from the fact that the act of being (esse)
of humans cannot be educed from the potencies of matter (see, for instance,
Summa theologiae, I, q. 90, art. 2, ad 2; q. 118, art. 2, in corp.; and q. 75, art. 6, ad
1). We shall, however, be restricting our attention to his two main types of
arguments for incorruptibility.
10. Summa theologiae, I, q. 75, art. 6, in corp. (Ottawa edition, p. 445a-445b):
"Ostensum est autem supra quod animae brutorum non sunt per se subsistentes, sed sola anima humana. Unde animae brutorum corrumpuntur, corruptis corporibus; anima autem humana non posset corrumpi, nisi per se corrumperetur. Quod quidem omnino est impossibile non solum de ipsa, sed de
quoIibet subsistente quod est forma tantum. Manifestum est enim quod id
quod secundum se convenit aIicui, est inseparabile ab ipso. Esse autem per se
convenit formae, quae est actus. Unde materia secundum hoc acquirit esse in
actu, quod acquirit formam; secundum hoc autem accidit in ea corruptio, quod
separatur forma ab ea. Impossibile est autem quod forma separetur a seipsa.
Unde impossibile est quod forma subsistens desinat esse."
11. This fundamental tenet is set forth in many of Aquinas's texts. See, for
example, Summa theologiae, I, q.75, art.1.
12. See, for instance, Quaestiones de anima, q. 19, in corp.
13. See, for instance, Summa theologiae, I, q.75, art.3 and Summa contra gentiles, II, cap.82.
14. See, for instance, Augustine's City oJGod, XIX, 26 (PL 41: 656).
15. Quaestiones de anima, q. 14, obj. 8 (Leonine edition, pp. 123-124):
"Augustinus dicit quod sicut Deus est uita anime, ita anima est uita corporis.
Set mors est priuatio uite. Ergo per mortem anima priuatur et tollitur."
16. Quaestiones de anima, q. 14, ad 8 (Leonine edition, p. 128): "Ad octauum
dicendum quod anima dicitur forma corporis in quantum est causa uite, sicut
forma est principium essendi: uiuere enim uiuentibus est esse, ut dicit
Philosophus in II De anima./I The reference to Aristotle is from De anima, II,
415b13.
17. De immortalitate animae red. by L. A. Kennedy, in Archives d'histoire doctrinale et litferaire du moyen age 45 (1978)], solutio [pp. 213-214]. As far as we are
aware, this short treatise, dated not too long after 1261, is considered authentic
(at least by Fries, Dondaine and Eschmann).
18. The argument rejected by Aquinas is a reformulation (using the principle 'nothing can be separated from itself) of the Platonic theme (Phaedo, 105c106e) that the soul as cause of life cannot admit of the opposite (namely, death).
19. Ibid.
20. Joseph Owens presents the argument for immortality from the principle 'nothing can be separated from itself' as though it is one made by Aquinas
himself and, this, even after acknowledging that Aquinas rejects it. See his
"Aquinas on the Inseparability ...," pp. 254-256. This may be due to the fact that
Owens interprets the reason Aquinas gives for rejecting the argument differently. According to him, Aquinas simply wants a proof not just from "the fact"
of immortality but, rather, from the "reason why" (p. 255). However, even if
his interpretation is preferable to our own, the argument should not and cannot be presented as a demonstration of the soul's immortality, for, it is rejected
as such. by Aquinas.
21. See, for instance, Summa theologiae, I, q. 75, art. 2, in corp. and
Quaestiones de anima, q. I, in corp.
22. Summa theologiae, I, q. 89, art. I, in corp. (Ottawa edition, pp. 550a-550b):
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"Si autem ponamus quod anima ex sua natura habeat ut intelligat convertendo
se ad phantasmata, cum natura animae post mortem corporis non mutetur,
videtur quod anima naturaliter nihil possit intelligere, cum non sint ei praesto
phantasmata ad quae convertatur. Et ideo hanc difficultatem tollendam considerandum est quod cum nihil operetur nisi in quantum est actu, modus
operandi uniuscuiusque rei sequitur modum essendi ipsius. Habet autem
anima alium modum essendi cum unitur corpori, et cum fuerit a corpore separata, manente tamen eadem animae natura; [... ] Animae igitur secundum ilIum
modum essendi quo corpori est unita, competit modus intelligendi per conversionem ad phantasmata corporum, quae in corporeis organis sunt; cum autem
fuerit a corpore separata, competit ei modus intelligendi per conversionem ad
ea quae sunt intelligibilia simpliciter, sicut et aliis substantiis separatis."
23. See, for instance, Summa theologiae, 1, q. 89, art. 1, in corp. (Ottawa edition, p. 550b): "Unde modus intelligendi per conversionem ad phantasmata est
ani mae naturalis, sicut et corpori uniri; sed esse separatam a corpore est
praeter rationem suae naturae, et similiter intelligere sine conversione ad phantasmata est ei praeter naturam."
24. Summa theologiae, I, q. 89, art. 1, in corp. (Ottawa edition, p. 550b):
"Unde modus intelligendi per conversionem ad phantasmata est animae naturalis, sicut et corpori uniri; sed esse separatam a corpore est praeter rationem
suae naturae, et similiter intelligere sine conversione ad phantasmata est ei
praeter naturam."
25. It is interesting to note that the difficulty caused by Aristotle's requirement of phantasms for human thinking gave rise to a controversy at the beginning of the 16th century and that Cajetan, while granting that the incorruptibility of the human soul is philosophically demonstrable, came to deny that the
soul's immortality is philosophically demonstrable. These two points are mentioned by Joseph Owens in his" Aquinas on the Inseparability ...," pp. 268-269
and it is to him that we owe the following references: regarding the controv..ersy over the Aristotelian requirement of phantasms for human thinking, see Etienne Gilson's "Autour de Pomponazzi. Problematique de l'immortalite de
l'ime en Italie au debut du XVIe siecle," Archives d'histoire doctrinale et litteraire
du moyen age 28 (1961): 163-279; and for references to passages in Cajetan's
works, see John P. Reilly's Cajetan's Notion of Existence, (Paris/The Hague:
Vrin/Martinus Njihoff, 1971), pp. 95-102, esp. 99-100.
26. This is acknowledged by Joseph Owens in his" Aquinas on the
Inseparability ...," p. 268.

